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This paper aims to quantify the impact of the minimum wage on labour market 
performance in the Czech Republic. Using regional data for 1995-2004, it estimates 
the effect of the minimum wage adjusted for regional wage differential on the 
regional unemployment. Consequently, using detail individual data from 2004/2005, 
we analyze the annual hikes in the minimum wage that allow us to estimate 
employment probabilities for  workers with wage level at, or close to, the new 
minimum wage. The aim is to reveal whether the most endangered groups of 
workers exhibited significantly  different employment probabilities. Our results 
reveal that the minimum wage has had a significant impact on increasing regional 
unemployment and reducing the employment probabilities of low-paid workers. 
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1   Introduction 
Almost all the developed countries use some form of wage legislation that prevents wages to 
fall below certain threshold. Indeed,  several conventions of International Labour Office 
recommend minimum wage concept  as an instrument of  workers’ protection.
1 However, 
institution of minimum wage and its economic consequences have been traditionally in the 
centre of both academic and political discussions and subject to many controversies.
 2   
On one hand, proponents  of minimum wage mostly seek arguments in social area. The main 
goal of the minimum wage is usually put as reduction (or prevention) of poverty, decreasing 
income inequality, improvement of living conditions of low-paid workers and making “work 
pay”. Indeed, certain positive employment consequences of minimum wage were reported for 
instance by Dickens et al. (1999), Card and Krueger (1995) or Dolado et al. (1999). Also, Lee 
(1999) showed a positive effect of minimum wage on decreasing income differentiation; Card 
(1992) and Bazen and Martin (1991) indicated a positive effect on increasing wages of young 
workers.  
However, the potential of the minimum wage in a fight against general poverty is rather 
limited. Burkhauser et al. (1996) state that mainly higher-income households profit from the 
minimum wage. Borjas (2005) confirms this result and estimates that only 19% of increase in 
incomes resulting from growing minimum wage between 1989 and 1992 was registered in 
poor households. As was indicated by OECD (1998) in its study on nine developed countries 
in 1993, the major part (60-90%) of low-paid workers paid below two thirds of wage median 
                                                 
1 Czech Republic ratified two out of three conventions recommending the introduction of minimum wage. 
2 Minimum wage might be either statutory, established by the government, or set as an extension of collective 
bargaining agreements. Many „old“ European countries don’t have legally binding minimum wage, but usually 
there exist an effective minimum wage determined by collective bargaining (Austria, Italy, Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden).   2 
lived in medium- or high-income households. On the other hand, the proportion of low-paid 
workers living in the poorest households was around 10% only. Thus, minimum wage doesn’t 
seem to be an efficient instrument in preventing general poverty.  
On the other hand, there are significant critics of minimum wage, who stress the potential 
adverse impacts on raising labour costs of firms and increasing unemployment among the 
least productive workers (Deere et al., 1995; Neumark and Wascher, 2003; Abowd et al., 
1999; Bazen and Martin, 1991). From the similar perspective, OECD in its Jobs Strategy 
(1994) emphasises the allocation function of wages in providing essential information 
regarding the employment opportunities. In this sense, wage flexibility is of particular 
importance. However, flexibility might be reduced if the minimum wage level is set too high, 
resulting in negative effects on employment.  
Economic theorists have not reached a broad consensus regarding the consequences of 
minimum wage so far. Nevertheless, it is usually generally accepted that although it might 
have certain positive impact on motivation to productivity increase among low-paid workers 
(Stigler, 1946, Acemoglu a Pischke, 1998, Cahuc a Michell, 1996), as a motivation device in 
efficient wages framework (see Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995, or Manning, 1995), or in case of a 
monopsony (Card and Krueger, 1995), there exists a threshold,  over which the negative 
effects of minimum wage tend to prevail. Minimum wage then increases the unemployment 
and causes economic losses in terms of economic efficiency. The effect is stronger for 
particular groups of workers with the lowest productivity, especially the youngest and the 
least experienced. This situation is to certain extent confirmed by existing empirical research. 
For a summary of empirical research results on this issue see e.g. Brown, Gilroy and Kohen 
(1982) or OECD (1998). 
Czech Republic has introduced the minimum wage in 1991 as a part of its sweeping labour 
market reforms. Minimum wage in the Czech Republic exhibited a dynamic growth since late 
1990s with a certain slackening after 2003. Yet, empirical evidence on economic 
consequences of the minimum wage in the Czech Republic is rather limited. The first analysis 
was conducted by Buchtí ková  (1995) on the early 1990s data. The author constructed an 
econometric simulation to manifest effects of a wage growth driven by the minimum wage 
hikes on employment in firms. The results indicate that increasing minimum wage doesn’t 
necessarily have to result in a higher unemployment. The negative effect would be more 
apparent in particular industries (textile, machinery, wood-processing, foods) and groups of   3 
workers (young, women and part-time workers). However, the data covered state-owned 
enterprises only and, hence, the interpretation power of the results is rather limited.  
Gottvald et al. (2002) examined the effects of minimum wage on employment and wage 
distribution in the Czech Republic in period 1998-2002. The authors prove a significant 
positive effect of minimum wage on wages in given period, whereas the magnitude of the 
effect diminishes as one moves up on the wage scale.  The effect on unemployment proved to 
be rather low and was not statistically significant, as in the previous study. Similar results 
were reported by Ericsson and Pytlikova (2004) in their study on data for the same period. 
They evaluate the effect of minimum wage on wages as positive in general, while the impact 
on employment as ambiguous. The employment effect was even positive in case of large 
companies employing a large share of low-paid workers (the authors attribute this result to 
increased motivation stemming from growing minimum wage and its distance from the 
subsistence minimum); on the other hand, minimum wage hikes had negative consequences in 
small businesses. 
Therefore, based on the results of previous economic research in the Czech environment, we 
can expect some positive effects of minimum wage on increasing wage level of workers (i.e. 
those, who sustain their job even after a minimum wage hike) and, consequently, perhaps also 
on increasing the motivation of unemployed or inactive people to find a job. However, their 
chance to be hired might be reduced as a result of increased costs of firms in employing low-
productive workers. In existing research, there is no clear consensus regarding what the 
effects of minimum wage on employment and unemployment in the Czech  environment 
would be. In this context, this paper is concerned with the impact of minimum wage on 
employment and unemployment in the Czech Republic. 
Using regional data  for 1995-2004 and 2004/2005 individual data from the Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions database we aim to find out whether the minimum wage did 
indeed influence the labour market performance. More precisely, on the regional level, we 
estimate  the effect of  the minimum wage adjusted for regional wage differential on  the 
regional unemployment. Consequently, using detail individual data we analyze the annual 
hikes in the minimum wage and categorize workers into several groups based on their wage 
level relative to the minimum wage. We focus on the workers, whose wage in period t was 
lower or marginally higher than the new minimum wage in period t+1, and estimate the 
subsequent employment probabilities in period  t+1. We aim to reveal whether the most 
endangered groups of workers exhibited significantly different employment probabilities.   4 
Based on our results we aim to reveal whether the minimum wage has had any adverse effect 
on the Czech labour market performance.  
The paper is organized as follows: The next section provides an overview of the development 
of minimum wage in the Czech Republic and puts it into a broader economic and social 
context. Section 3 is devoted to the macro analysis of minimum wage effects on 
unemployment on regional level. Section 4 presents the analysis of minimum wage 
consequences on individual level, depicts the  methodology for the employment equation 
estimations and the model. The main results and discussion are summarized in Section 5.  
2   Minimum wage development and its socioeconomic consequences in 
the Czech Republic 
Minimum wage in the Czech Republic was introduced in 1991 together with a system of 
minimum wage tariffs, fixing the minimum wage rates for particular occupations.
3  Sub-
minimum wage tariffs for young and disabled supplemented the system to eliminate potential 
negative employment effects. Basic minimum wage rate was firstly set relatively high, at 
CZK 2 , 000.
4 However, its  nominal  level was not considerably adjusted until late 1990s. 
Consequently, real value of the minimum wage was continually falling to its historical 
minimum in 1998, when it reached 63% of the real 1991-value. The development, together 
with a comparison with the average wage level and other economic variables, is summarized 
in Table 1 and Figure 1.  
Table 1. Minimum wage (MW) and average wage (AW) in the CR, 1991-2007, CZK 
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
MW  2000  2200  2200  2200  2200  2500  2500  2650  3425*  4250*  5000  5700  6200  6700  7185  7763*  8000  8000 
AW  3792  4644  6095  7226  8572  10141  11132  12163  13181  14029  15248  16363  17443  18589  19591  20855  22384 23659** 
MW/AW (%)  52.7  47.4  36.1  30.4  25.7  24.7  22.5  21.8  26.0  30.3  32.8  34.8  35.5  36.0  36.7  37.2  35.7  33.8** 
Note: *figure refers to annual average (minimum wage was increased in January and July); ** data on average 
wage in Q1-Q3 2008. 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the CR, Czech Statistical Office 
 
                                                 
3 After the collapse of central administration of wages at the beginning of 1990s, the system of minimum wage 
tariffs was firstly intended as temporary and was designed to protect workers, until the system of collective 
bargaining over wages would develop to take over this function. The tariffs are binding for firms without a 
collective agreement. The number of tariff classes was diminished in 1996, fully re-introduced in 2000 and 
reduced to eight in 2006 again (renamed to “guaranteed wage” by the new Labour Code). However, even the 
highest, eighth tariff amounted to less than 80% of average wage only, which makes these tariffs a completely 
ineffective limitation for more human capital intensive occupations. 
4 This represented more than 50% of average wage in the economy as such a threshold was considered a 
common level in the western European countries.   5 
There were several reasons for such stagnation: weak position of trade unions in early 1990s; 
restrictive government’s income policy introduced in 1991 by a system of wage regulation; 
and last but not least, legal interconnection between the minimum wage and social system. 
Many social benefits were explicitly linked to the minimum wage. In this interrelated political 
framework, increasing minimum wage pushed up the state’s social expenditure and caused 
budgetary pressures, which made the hikes in minimum wage politically unacceptable.  
The real slump in the minimum wage value during 1990s was subject to critiques of many 
international organizations. The former connection to social system was thus released in 1998 
and a way towards the minimum wage growth was opened. Minimum wage started to grow 
substantially and was increased by 29% in 1999 and by 24% in 2000. Consequently, it 
reached its real 1991-value in 2001. However, the pace of nominal growth gradually 
decelerated (hovered around 8% in 2003-2006 period) and finally stopped in 2008 and 2009, 
when minimum wage was not increased at all.  
Figure 1. Minimum wage (MW) and average wage (AW), CPI and labour productivity 
growth in the CR, 1991-2007, y/y % 
 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the CR, Czech Statistical Office, own calculations 
 
According to the wage law, minimum wage development should reflect the movements in 
prices and wages to sustain its purchasing power. The real growth of minimum wage was 
negative until 1998 (with an exception of 1996), as its increments did not exceed the high 
annual inflation (see Figure 1). Situation changed in 1999 when nominal gains in minimum 
wage values markedly overstepped inflation, which tempered (these two figures roughly 
equalised in 2007). It is clear that minimum wage has not followed the development of 
consumer prices and wages in the CR, despite its intended interconnection stated by the law.   6 
Data also do not reflect any relation to developments in average wage or productivity of 
labour, as minimum wage rose relatively faster in periods with lower productivity gains. 
Thus, it seems that in the examined period, minimum wage development pursued rather 
political goals in social area, not reflecting the developments in real economy. 
However, the absolute level of the minimum wage doesn’t reflect its real importance and 
economic consequences. As for the economic impact, its position in overall wage distribution 
is of a key importance. This relationship is indicated by the Kaitz index, stating the share of 
the statutory minimum wage on the average gross wage in the economy (see Figure 2).
5 This 
ratio was rather high when the minimum wage was firstly introduced: it reached 53% of the 
economy-wide average in 1991. However, during the 1990s it drastically dropped to its 
minimum in 1998, amounting to 22% only. The development since 1999 meant a recurrent 
growth in this proportion that roughly stabilised around 36-37% since  2003. Moreover, 
according to the Czech Statistical Office (2008), minimum wage reached more than two thirds 
of the first wage decile value in 2007. This might represent a considerable burden for 
employment of the least-productive and least-paid workers. 
On the other hand, effects on motivation of low-paid workers or not working persons to 
accept a paid job is indicated by the relation between the net minimum wage and subsistence 
minimum level, as depicted in Figure 2. Net minimum wage didn’t exceed the subsistence 
level of a one-member household during the whole 1990s.
6 We can hardly expect that 
minimum wage would meet its goals in motivation of low-paid worker groups in the 
environment where social income in non-activity exceeds the potential minimum labour 
income. Minimum wage overgrew the subsistence minimum of a one-member household only 
in 2000 and kept increasing moderately since then. There was a large upward jump of the 
ratio of minimum wage to subsistence minimum in 2007 related to the social reform measures 
and cuts in social expenditure. Thus, the motivation role of the minimum wage might have 
been increased by reforms in 2007. However, its real potential to meet its goals might be 
limited due to the adverse effects on motivation of employers to hire the low-productive 
workers for a pay over their productivity. 
                                                 
5 This index might understate the overall impact of minimum wages due to progressivity of tax systems. Also, 
average wage might be highly distorted by the shifts in the highest level of wage distribution, without any 
change in the lowest deciles mostly influenced by the minimum wage. Thus, median and net wage might be a 
better choice for evaluating the development of economic impact of the minimum wage in time or comparison 
across countries (OECD, 1998). However, comparable data sources are limited. 
6 The institution of subsistence minimum was introduced later than the minimum wage, as late as by the end of 
1991. Developments of these two policy instruments were completely independent until late 1990s.   7 
Sometimes, minimum wage function is perceived not on an individual level only, but takes 
into account welfare of whole families. In concepts of the ILO
7 or the European Social 
Charter of the Council of Europe, minimum wage should represent a level of remuneration 
that will provide workers and their families with a decent standard of living.
8 Such an 
approach, however, is not applied in the Czech Republic. Minimum wage amounted to 
roughly 20-30% of subsistence level of a four-member household between 1991 and 2000 and 
slightly increased to 50% in 2004-2006— see Figure 2. The surge towards 70% in 2007 is 
again attributable to already mentioned social reform measures. Thus, minimum wage is 
rather based on an individual approach in the Czech Republic, not reflecting the family 
concept. 
Figure 2. Minimum wage (MW) as a share of average wage (AW) and subsistence 
minimum (SM) of one- and four-member household in the CR, 1991-2007, % 
 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the CR, Czech Statistical Office, own calculations 
Note: SM1 –  subsistence minimum for an individual household; SM4 –  subsistence minimum of a four-member 
household, two adults, two kids. 
 
Despite the substantial increases of  minimum wage since 1999, its level in the Czech 
Republic still remains rather low in an international comparison. Statutory national minimum 
wage has been introduced in twenty European Union member states and ranged from EUR 92 
(Bulgaria) to EUR 1570 (Luxembourg) in 2007. Czech Republic with EUR 288 founds itself 
in the low part of the spectrum, together with most of the other new member countries.
9 The 
rating doesn’t change much after adjusting for the differences in price levels when the 
                                                 
7 Convention No. 131: Minimum Wage Fixing Convention. 
8 Such concept was already introduced into practice for instance by the city of Baltimore, US in 1994. The 
“living wage” ordinance was approved that required businesses with city contracts to pay their workers wage 
exceeding the national poverty level for a family of 4, which lies significantly above the federal minimum wage. 
In many European countries, minimum wage is roughly equal to the subsistence minimum of a four-member 
household (for instance France: 100%, Portugal and Ireland: more than 80% - source: Eurostat and European 
Commission). 
9All three remaining Visegrad countries were below the Czech level with even lower minimum wages (for 
details see Fialová  and Schneider, 2009).   8 
differentiation of countries narrows. Minimum wage expressed in PPS in the EU varied from 
204 (Bulgaria) to 1503 (Luxembourg) in 2006, Czech minimum wage went relatively up to 
465, but kept the same relative position among the countries as when expressed in EUR.
 10   
If we compare the real economic burden represented by the minimum wage when reflecting 
the different labour productivity and average wage level in the countries, minimum wage 
reached about 40% of average wage in industry and services in 2006 in the Czech Republic 
(Eurostat, 2007). Most of the new member states attained lower shares (the lowest, slightly 
over 30%, were recorded in the Baltic States), while most of the former members reached 
higher values (the highest, Ireland and Luxembourg, hovered around 50%). Consequently, 
proportion of full-time workers with earnings on the minimum wage was rather low in the 
Czech Republic: 2.3% in 2006, while in many countries the proportion exceeded 8% (e.g. 
France, Luxembourg, Latvia, and Bulgaria). However, proportion of women paid on 
minimum wage in the Czech Republic was more than double compared to the men’s share 
(3.5% and 1.4% respectively).
11 Therefore, women are endangered by hikes in the minimum 
wage relatively more than men. 
3   The impact of minimum wage on regional level 
In this paper, we focus on potential adverse consequences of minimum wage on labour market 
performance. In this section, we estimate the potential negative impact of minimum wage on 
unemployment on the regional level. We utilize the differences in average wage levels among 
the seventy seven Czech districts.
12 We might expect that the districts with relatively lower 
average wages would suffer from the nation-wide setting of minimum wage relatively more, 
as it would represent a larger economic burden for firms and regional economies. Thus, our 
assumption is that, as a result of minimum wage affecting the regional labour markets, low-
wage districts will ceteris paribus exhibit higher rate of unemployment than the high-wage 
                                                 
10 However, as mention e.g. Dolado et al. (1996), a relatively higher minimum wage level does not necessarily 
have to represent larger economic burden. The existence of special sub-minimum wage tariffs for more 
threatened groups can mitigate the adverse effects of higher minimum wage. 
11 Larger share of women working for the minimum wage than respective share of men was common in almost 
all the European countries with the exception of Malta and Hungary. Comparably large differences in these two 
figures were recorded for instance in Luxembourg, Portugal or the Netherlands. 
12 The coefficient of variation of average wages among the 77 Czech districts (NUTS-4 level) grew substantially 
during 1990s and has stabilised since 1998 around 10% (with certain volatility). However, the wage disparities 
among regions are much lower than the differences in unemployment: coefficient of variation of regional 
unemployment rates has been fluctuating between 40% and 50% since 2000 (source: Czech Statistical Office and 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, own calculations).    9 
districts.
13 To estimate the burden of minimum wage we use the ratio of minimum wage to the 
gross average wage in the district in particular year. 
The first  brief analysis o f  the regional-level data, indeed, reveals a positive relationship 
between the ratio of minimum wage to the average regional wage and regional unemployment 
rate. The districts with prevailing low wage level registered relatively higher rates of 
unemployment in 2004-2005:
14 the unemployment rate in ten lowest-wage districts (high 
share of minimum/average wage) reached 11.1%, while it amounted to 7.9% in ten highest-
wage districts. Correlation coefficient between unemployment and minimum wage as a 
proportion of average wage in the districts was positive and reached 0.3 in 2004-2005. 
However, to analyze causal relationship between the minimum wage and unemployment, we 
have to use more sophisticated models, as follows in the next section. 
3.1   Methodology, data and variables description 
To estimate effect of minimum wage on regional unemployment more consistently, we used 
the generalised least squares regression analysis on panel data. We employ the data from 77 
districts of the Czech Republic (NUTS-4 level) in years 1995-2004.
15 The source of data is 
the Czech Statistical Office
16 and unemployment statistics of the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs.  
To reveal the effect of minimum wage on unemployment and to simultaneously control for 
other factors of influence, we use the following characteristics of the districts. The average 
yearly unemployment rate (U) represents the endogenous variable. Among the explanatory 
variables, the ratio of nation-wide minimum wage to the average regional wage (MWAW) 
comes on the first place. According to our assumption stated above, we expect a positive 
effect of this variable on the explanatory variable.  
In our analysis we are limited by low availability of relevant data on other control variables 
that might also affect the overall unemployment level in the region. Some of the data was 
                                                 
13 Similar relationship was already indicated by DiNardo et al. (1996), who describe more pronounced effects of 
the minimum wage in the states experiencing lower average wages. 
14 We chose the period 2004-2005 due to limitation of data: data series on wages in the districts (NUTS4) end in 
2005 and, moreover, there was a break in the methodology of reporting the unemployment by Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs from 2004 on.  
15 Our dataset is limited by year 2004 as this is the last year when detailed regional statistics on the NUTS-4 
level were reported by the Czech Statistical Office. Later on, more detailed statistics switched to more 
aggregated NUTS-3 level corresponding to the standard general European approach. 
16 Publication “Districts of the Czech Republic in Year…”    10 
available for period 1995-2001 only. Thus, in the initial basic analysis we only cover five 
independent control variables in period 1995-2004 (model (1)).  
In the basic dataset of model (1) we control for the overall situation and tightness of the 
regional labour market by including the vacancy rate in the region (VACR). The share of self-
employed entrepreneurs on 1,000 inhabitants of the region ( ENT) reflects the activity of 
regional population; higher level of self-employment might push the regional unemployment 
down. We also control for the educational level of population in the districts by adding the 
variable stating the share of population older than 15 years that attained tertiary educational 
degree (TERTIARY). Regional unemployment also differs according to the urbanization of 
regions as rural regions typically exhibit lesser employment opportunities than urban districts. 
Thus, we also account for the urbanization of the region as a share of inhabitants living in the 
cities (URB). As there exist significant regional disparities in the Czech Republic and the 
capital Prague represents the economic centre of the country and source of economic growth, 
we also add the variable stating the distance of the regional capital from the country capital, 
Prague (DIST). 
In further analysis (model (2)), we narrow the time period to 1995-2001 and add two more 
explanatory variables to check the robustness of the previous results. This adjusted dataset 
also reflects the sector structure of employment by covering the share of working labour force 
employed in the primary sector ( EMPA) and the development of capital construction 
expenditure in the region (CAPCON), reflecting the trends in economic development of the 
region itself.
17  
The regression equation then takes the following form: 
lnU ti = α + β1 lnMWAWti + β2 lnVACRt +  β3 ENTti + β4 TERTIARYti  + β5 URBti + 
β6DISTti  + (β7 EMPAti + β8 lnCAPCONti) + εti,         (1) 
where ε represents normally distributed residuals with zero mean and constant variance. In 
line with the common practice in this type of research, the dependent variable, the ratio of 
minimum wage to the average regional wage and vacancy rate are represented in logs.
18 We 
use the random effects regression model employing the generalised least squares procedure, 
because time variability of variables DIST and TERTIARY is zero and in such a case, fixed 
effects model is not applicable. As the data reflect the information regarding units of different 
                                                 
17 The descriptive statistics of the variables are available from the authors upon request. 
18 Capital construction expenditure is represented in log, as well, to eliminate the potential source of 
heteroskedasticity (as the data covers units of different size). The expression of variables as logs allows us to 
interpret the regression coefficients as elasticities.   11 
size, presence of heteroskedasticity is highly probable. Therefore, we use the robust estimates 
of variance of the regression coefficients. Moreover, the residual analyses indicate the 
autocorrelation (AR1), therefore we utilise econometric procedures eliminating this effect. 
Consequently, our analysis will offer consistent and efficient estimates.
19  
3.2   Results 
The results of our regression models are stated in Table 2. In the basic model covering longer 
time period (model (1.a)), all the six explanatory variables proved to be significant. The 
expected effect of the variables was confirmed with the exception of variables URB and ENT 
that indicated a low positive effect on unemployment. Our results suggest that the impact of 
self-employment might be unambiguous within the transitional processes that took place in 
given period. The effect of urbanisation might be also more complex: high urbanisation has 
been connected with both higher share of expanding tertiary sector in some districts but also 
with contracting secondary sector in other districts. Thus, besides the low-unemployment 
districts (Prague, Brno, Plzeň  etc.), there were also highly urbanised industrial districts of 
northern Bohemia and northern Moravia, suffering from the restructuring processes and high 
levels of unemployment. 
                                                 
19 The conducted Chow tests rejected the hypotheses of stability of regression coefficients among the districts, 
which puts some doubts on our approach to analysis of the data as a panel. However, applying a Chow test puts 
rather restrictive assumptions on the character of input data and residuals (e.g. homoskedasticity of residuals; for 
more details see Greene, 2003), which were not fulfilled by the data used. Therefore, we accept the assumption 
of general homogeneity of the Czech Republic as regards the reactions of unemployment to the development of 
various factors of influence due to similar institutional and socio-cultural background. Consequently, we proceed 
to analysis of the data as a panel.   12 
Table 2. Regression estimation results –  regional data analysis 
  
Model 
(1.a)    
Model 
(1.b)    
Model 
(2.a)    
Model 
(2.b)    
Model 
(2.c)    
Constant  -1.022  ***  -0.510    -1.031  *  -0.328    -0.176   
  (0.315)    (0.334)    (0.511)    (0.544)    (0.404)   
lnMWAW  0.314  ***  0.724  ***  0.391  ***  0.652  ***  0.639  *** 
  (0.072)    (0.082)    (0.093)    (0.107)    (0.105)   
lnVACR  -0.113  ***  -0.209  ***  -0.158  ***  -0.256  ***  -0.256  *** 
  (0.016)    (0.018)    (0.022)    (0.025)    (0.025)   
ENT  0.011  ***      0.012  ***         
  (0.001)        (0.001)           
TERTIARY  -0.164  ***  -0.074  ***  -0.159  ***  -0.084  ***  -0.087  *** 
  (0.019)    (0.016)    (0.021)    (0.019)    (0.018)   
URB  0.015  ***      0.019  ***         
  (0.003)        (0.004)           
DIST  0.003  ***  0.002  ***  0.003  ***  0.002  ***  0.002  *** 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
EMPA          0.014  *  0.005       
          (0.008)    (0.008)       
lnCAPCON          -0.088  **  0.006       
          (0.037)    (0.041)       
N (districts, time):  770 (77, 10)  770 (77, 10)  539 (77, 7)    539 (77, 7)    539 (77, 7)   
R
2 overall:  0.475    0.451    0.430    0.389    0.402   
R
2 within:  0.758    0.525    0.764    0.445    0.441   
R
2 between:  0.274    0.427    0.248    0.406    0.429   
Note: *** significant 1%, ** significant 5%, * significant 10% 
Random effects generalized least squares estimation method, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the CR, Czech Statistical Office, own calculations 
 
Therefore, we exclude the variables ENT and URB due to an unambiguous relationship with 
the regional unemployment. This step also significantly improves the explanatory power of 
the model in case of between-groups variation and decreases the overall explanatory power 
only negligibly. The reduced form of the basic model (1.b) includes four exogenous variables 
only: MWAW, VACR, TERTIARY and DIST. All these variables proved to be significant. The 
model explains almost 50% of the variation of unemployment in the districts in time. 
Our results for model (1) indicate that the share of minimum wage on the average wage in the 
region has a significant positive effect on regional unemployment. However, the results are 
sensitive to inclusion of the variable ENT. The elasticity of unemployment with respect to 
MWAW amounts to 0.3-0.7 (depending of inclusion of variables  ENT and  URB); i.e. is 
positive and lower than one. Furthermore, higher education level of districts’ population and 
higher supply of vacancies decrease the unemployment in regions. On the other hand, larger 
distance from Prague brings along higher rates of regional unemployment.  
If we add two more variables and narrow the time period (model (2.a)) we get similar results. 
Again, the results are sensitive to including variable ENT, which influences the explanatory 
power of the model and regression coefficients and their significance.  After excluding 
variable ENT and URB (model (2.b)), variables EMPA (that was in the original model only   13 
significant at  10% level) and  CAPCON become insignificant and consequently were 
excluded, too.  
The final, reduced model (2.c) leaves us with four explanatory variables, again as in model 
(1.b), that are significant and show similar effect on the endogenous variable as in the basic 
model. The model explains 40% of the variation of unemployment in the districts in time. The 
variable MWAW shows a significant positive effect in all the models (2.a-c), but its magnitude 
slightly alters according to the control variables covered. The elasticity of regional 
unemployment with respect to the share of minimum wage on the average wage in the region 
reaches 0.4-0.6.  
Overall, our results indicate that since 1995, increasing minimum wage expressed as a share 
on the average regional wage did have a significant effect on increasing the unemployment 
rate in regions. The estimates of the elasticity are, however, not robust, are sensitive to 
inclusion of particular variables and amount to 0.3-0.7. That means that increasing the share 
of minimum wage on the average wage in the region by 1% leads to a rise in unemployment 
by 0.3-0.7%.  
An increase in the ratio MWAW occurs if the minimum wage grows relatively faster than the 
average wage. In 2001, for instance, minimum wage rate went up by 18%. Therefore, if the 
average wage growth in a region did not exceed this level, we can expect that minimum wage 
increase led to higher unemployment in the respective regions. Looking at the data from 2001, 
we find that the average wage growth was indeed below the minimum wage growth: wages 
grew by more than 10% in five districts only (Ostrava, Kutná  Hora, Kladno, Jihlava, and 
Beroun) and by more than the 18% threshold in a single district only (Kutná  Hora). Thus, in 
all the regions but one, we may expect a negative effect on unemployment. We can also 
expect the districts where the ratio MWAW increased most rapidly between 1995 and 2004 to 
be negatively affected the most. Indeed, eight out of ten districts, which exhibited more than 
55% growth in  MWAW in given period, recorded considerably over-average levels of 
unemployment in 2004.
20 
Our results  indicate  significant adverse effect of minimum wage on the regional 
unemployment. However, macroeconomic district-level data reflects a large spectrum of 
factors and we cannot attribute a substantial part of the differences in unemployment to the 
                                                 
20 High unemployment levels were registered in Karviná  (21.1%). Frý dek-Mí stek (15.2%), Sokolov (13.5%), 
Hodoní n (15.2%), Třebíč (13.6%), Louny (16.1%), Chomutov (18.1%), Karlovy Vary (11%). On the other hand, 
low, below-average unemployment was sustained in Pí sek (8.2%) and Tá bor (6.5%). The country average 
reached 10.2% in 2004.   14 
effect of minimum wage only. To estimate the labour market impact of minimum wage more 
precisely, we supplement our approach by the analysis of individual level data. 
4   The impact of minimum wage on individual level 
In this section, we estimate the potential negative impact of minimum wage on employment 
on the individual level. Our analysis comes out from an assumption based on the theory of 
competitive markets: in case that productivity of workers remains the same, hikes in the 
nominal wage render the workers originally paid between the old and new minima currently 
unemployable.  
We use the hike in the minimum wage value from 2004 (t) to 2005 (t+1) to identify the 
groups of individuals mostly endangered by this provision: at the first place, these are the 
workers paid at a level right between the old and new statutory minimum. Secondly, due to 
significant spill-over effects (OECD 1998), workers originally paid marginally over the new 
minimum might also be hit. We suppose that these two groups of individuals have 
significantly lower probabilities of staying employed after the hike in minimum wage takes 
place. Therefore, we compare conditional probabilities of being full-time employed in period 
t+1  given a full-time employment status in period  t,  p(et+1=1|et=1), for these groups of 
individuals with individuals who were paid considerable over the new statutory minimum in 
reference period t . In our approach we use logistic regression to estimate conditional 
probabilities. In our analysis we employ a similar approach to that of Abowd et al. (1997). 
4.1   Methodology, data and variables 
The household survey European Union— Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) data was employed.
21 Reference period for income variables, t, is the year 2004; the 
majority of other variables is related to the current situation at the time of the survey, t+1, 
which means Q2 2005. The data provides us with yearly net wages; therefore, the net monthly 
earned income was constructed according to the number of worked months.  
The  original  data  set  includes 10,333 individuals (8,628 aged 1 6 and over) in 4,351 
households. In our study, only individuals 16 to 64 years old are considered. We cover only 
those individuals, who reported full-time employment in last four months of reference period t 
                                                 
21 EU-SILC is a new panel survey which replaced the ECHP survey in 2004. It is a harmonized survey 
compulsory for all EU member states. The information is collected on both household level (mainly information 
on living conditions) and individual level (e.g. individual and job characteristics, wages, income, social 
allowances).   15 
and part-time employment, full-time employment, unemployment, retirement, or out of labour 
force status in period t+1.
22 Further, self-employed are eliminated since their income contains 
irregularities which would make the analysis biased. We also exclude individuals reporting 
their wage below the minimum wage. Further, we eliminate individuals, who received any 
sickness benefits in 2004 as this biases their wage considerably.  
In other words, only individuals who moved between full-time employment in t and full-time 
employment, part-time employment, unemployment, retirement and inactivity during period 
t+1 are included. This leaves us with 3,070 individuals. Individual weights were included, 
which reflect the number of people in the whole population who are represented by  the 
particular individual. 
The logistic regression is used for computations since the endogenous variable in the applied 
model is dichotomous. This variable is being employed  full-time in the current reference 
period t+1 (Q2 2005, i.e. 4 to 6 months lagged to the income reference period t) and takes the 
value of 1 if the individual was full-time employed and 0 if she/he is part-time employee, 
unemployed, retired, or out of labour force. The logistic model takes the following form: 
ln [p/(1-p)] = β0 + βi Xi,                                                                                               (2) 
where  p is the probability of staying employed in  t+1 conditional on employment in t 
p(et+1=1|et=1), vector Xi includes all explanatory variables. The explanatory variables included 
in equation (2) were individuals’ minimum wage status, age, education, sex, occupational 
category, and region as a proxy for general trends in the unemployment rate.
23 
The minimum wage status (MWST_j) is the individual’s position in the wage distribution 
given the  relation to the net minimum wage in t  and  t+1.  MWST_1 represents those 
employees receiving a wage higher than minimum wage in  t, but at the same time not 
exceeding the minimum wage in  t+1 ( “between” employees).  MWST_2 represents those 
employees who were paid marginally over the minimum wage in t+1 (“marginally over” 
employees). Therefore, thresholds are represented by the net minimum wage in 2004 (CZK 
5,459), 2005 (CZK 5,819) and 1.5 multiple of 2005’s level for the interval  “marginally 
                                                 
22 We limit our reference period to four months only because covering the whole year 2004 would be too 
restrictive. Four-month period also exclude those people employed in probation period only (generally lasts three 
months in the Czech Republic). Part-time employees in the income reference period are excluded since their 
monthly income is incomparable with full-time workers’ wage. 
23 Descriptive statistics of the variables are available from the authors upon request.   16 
over”.
24 We adjust the intervals for errors in measurement (± 10%). The intervals are defined 
as follows: 
•  MWST_1 —  “between” :   
CZK 4,900 (MWt*0.9) < monthly net wage in t < CZK 6,400 (MWt+1*1.1); 
•  MWST_2—  “marginally over” :     
CZK 6,400 (MWt+1*1.1) ≤  monthly net wage in t < CZK 8,700 (MWt+1*1.5); 
•  MWST_3 —  “considerably over”  (reference variable):   
CZK 8,700 (MWt+1*1.5) ≤  monthly net wage in t. 
AGEk are the dummies for age reflecting also the work experience. Reference group is age 
35-44. The education variable (TER_EDUC) corresponds to tertiary education.
25 MALE is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 when the individual is male. ISCOl are variables classifying 
the occupation according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations. 
Reference group is ISCO9 (elementary occupations). REGm are dummies for region as a 
proxy for unemployment rates. The regions on NUTS-2 level were clustered into four groups 
given the level of unemployment to reflect the labour market situation in region where 
individuals live. Reference group is the Prague region.
26 
4.2   Results 
The results of a maximum likelihood logit estimation procedure are reported in Table 3. The 
results show that workers, whose 2004’s wage falls between the level of 2004 and 2005 
minima or marginally over 2005 minimum, have substantially lower subsequent employment 
probabilities in 2005 than have the workers, whose wage in 2004 exceeds the new 2005 
minimum considerably. The differences proved to be statistically significant. Moreover, the 
hike in minimum wage hits the “between” workers much harder than hits the workers paid 
“marginally over”: the coefficient of “between” workers group is much lower than the one of 
“marginally over” group. Furthermore, age and occupational variables proved to be relevant 
in explaining conditional employment probabilities: probability of subsequent employment 
significantly falls in groups aged 55-59 and 60-64 (the effect of retirement) and in ISCO 
group 0— armed forces (this relates to huge withdrawals from army and police in connection 
with the lustration law and the new civil service law). 
 
                                                 
24 Thresholds were adjusted for individuals aged 16-21 according to their respective sub-minimum wage tariffs.  
25 Dummy on primary education was excluded due to lack of relevant observations. 
26 REG2 consists of South-West, Central Bohemia and North-East, REG3 consists of South-East and Central 
Moravia, REG4 consists of North-West and Moravian-Silesian region.   17 
Table 3. Regression estimation results –  individual data analysis 
  Coeff.    S.E.  Odds ratio 
MWST_1  -1.8642  ***  (0.3565)  0.1550 
MWST_2  -0.7724  **  (0.3090)  0.4619 
MALE  0.4318    (0.2801)  1.5400 
AGE16_21  -0.3995    (0.6021)  0.6707 
AGE22_25  0.2824    (0.5775)  1.3264 
AGE26_34  -0.2547    (0.3652)  0.7752 
AGE45_54  0.3619    (0.4081)  1.4361 
AGE55_59  -1.2781  ***  (0.3896)  0.2786 
AGE60_64  -2.1715  ***  (0.5138)  0.1140 
TER_EDUC  -0.5694    (0.4587)  0.5658 
ISCO0  -2.8734  ***  (0.8819)  0.0565 
ISCO1  1.0208    (1.3588)  2.7753 
ISCO23  0.4164    (0.5217)  1.5165 
ISCO45  -0.1057    (0.4590)  0.8997 
ISCO67  -0.1811    (0.4722)  0.8343 
ISCO8  -0.6131    (0.4904)  0.5417 
REG2  0.1019    (0.4421)  1.1072 
REG3  0.3337    (0.4752)  1.3961 
REG4  -0.2523    (0.4568)  0.7770 
CONSTANT  4.2184    (0.6373)  67.9245 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level. Equation estimated by maximum likelihood logit. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample size: 3,070. Correctness of observation classification 97.5%.  
Source: EU-SILC data, own calculations 
 
The probabilities of employment resulting from the model have to be considered in relation to 
the relevant reference variable, which here consists of workers paid considerably more than 
the new minimum (more than 1.5 multiple of the 2005’s minimum wage net value). The odds 
ratio of the reference variable equals 1. When an individual exhibits the minimum wage status 
“between” ( MWST_1), his employment probability  decreases substantially: the odds ratio 
amounts to very low 0.16 (see Table 1). Furthermore, for workers with minimum wage status 
“marginally over” the new minimum wage (MWST_2), the odds ratio increases slightly to 
0.46 but still is well below one.  
That means that if we compare two otherwise completely similar individuals, the first one 
who is paid between the old and new minima, and the second whose net wage exceeds the 
new minimum considerably, the first one will be 0.16 times as likely to remain employed after 
the minimum wage hike compared to the second one. The respective drop in employment 
probability of a worker paid marginally over the new minimum reaches 0.46. The results, 
therefore, affirm our initial assumption and prove the negative effect of the minimum wage on 
employment probability of low-paid workers. The strength of this effect diminishes as one 
moves up the wage distribution.   18 
Despite the substantial negative effect estimated, the first of the at-risk groups is relatively 
small: workers in “between” group comprise 5.2% of the sample only. On the other hand, 
workers in group “marginally over” comprise relatively more, 18.5% of the sample, and the 
adverse effects might have a larger scope. However, as is usually assumed in the empirical 
literature, the differences in age-averages of the groups are not statistically significant and, 
therefore, the adverse effects are not limited to young workers only. 
5   Conclusions 
This paper aimed to quantify the impact of the minimum wage on labour market performance 
in the Czech Republic. There were substantial hikes in the minimum wage since late 1990s. 
The development of minimum wage tariffs was, however, not reflecting the trends in real 
economy and was mainly a result of political measures in social area. Despite the rapid 
growth, Czech Republic stays among more liberal countries in the EU as regards relative 
importance of minimum wage in the economic environment.  
Our analyses suggest that there really do exist significant adverse consequences of minimum 
wage on labour market performance. Using regional data for 1995-2004, we estimate the 
effect of varying economic burden represented by the ratio of the minimum wage to average 
regional wage on the regional unemployment. Our results indicate that since 1995, increasing 
minimum wage expressed as a share on the average regional wage had a significant effect on 
increasing the unemployment rate in regions. The estimates of the elasticity are, however, not 
robust, sensitive to inclusion of particular variables and amount to 0.3-0.7. That means that 
increasing the share of minimum wage on the average wage in the region by 1% leads to a 
rise in unemployment by 0.3-0.7%.  However, when interpreting the results, the low 
robustness of estimates must be taken into account.  
Consequently, using detailed individual data for 2004/2005, we exploit the annual hikes in the 
statutory minimum wage to identify workers, whose wage falls “between” the old and the new 
minimum wage level and  “marginally over” the new minimum wage. We estimate the 
subsequent employment probabilities of these workers compared to workers, whose wage 
exceeds the new minimum considerably. Our results show that when a worker exhibits the 
minimum wage status “between” in 2004, his/her subsequent employment probability in 2005 
decreases substantially: he/she is 0.16 times as likely to remain employed after the minimum 
wage hike compared to  a worker paid considerably over the minimum.  Furthermore, for 
workers who are “marginally over” the new minimum wage, the difference in probability   19 
increases slightly to 0.46, but still is well below one. The results, therefore, affirm our initial 
assumption and prove the negative effect of the minimum wage on employment probability of 
low-paid workers. The strength of this effect diminishes as one moves up the wage 
distribution. 
The potential of minimum wage in fighting poverty is generally rather limited as shows 
empirical literature on this topic (for details on the Czech Republic see also Fialová , 2007). 
Given its proven adverse effects on unemployment in regions and employment probabilities 
of low-paid workers, it seems valid to claim that minimum wage in the Czech Republic has 
not been a very purposeful and effective instrument so far. Instead, alternative measures of 
motivation of low-paid workers (e.g. negative income tax) without adverse effects on 
employment should be considered together with direct provisions aimed at enhancing the 
human capital of least productive workers.  
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